Chuck Brooks is the president of Brooks Consulting International and one of Executive Mosaic’s GovCon Experts.
Space has entered a new era. What was once primarily a sphere of scientific inquiry and exploration evolved into an economic engine, essential infrastructure layer and disputed national security environment. Communications, navigation, weather forecasting, intelligence, financial transactions, precision agriculture, disaster response and military activities are increasingly reliant on space systems and the terrestrial networks that connect them.
The more we rely on space, the more important its vulnerabilities become. The dilemma is no longer only about securing satellites. It protects a complex ecosystem that includes spacecraft, ground stations, launch infrastructure, cloud systems, software, data, supply chains and human operators.
That is why, in my opinion, the most important development in the emerging space era is the convergence of exploration, national security, commercial innovation, artificial intelligence, quantum and cybersecurity. The United States is simultaneously pursuing a return to the Moon, preparing for future Mars missions, expanding commercial space activity, building more resilient military architectures and developing new approaches to homeland missile defense. The result is a strategic transformation of the high frontier.
A New American Space Strategy
The White House’s December 2025 Executive Order on Ensuring American Space Superiority outlined four interconnected priorities: leading in space exploration, securing US interests in and through space, expanding the commercial space economy and developing advanced capabilities for the next century of space activity.
The order directs Americans to return to the Moon by 2028, build the foundation of a permanent lunar outpost by 2030, develop commercial launch services and pave the route to Mars. It also directs the United States to improve its capabilities to detect, classify and fight threats from very low-Earth orbit and cislunar space.
This is significant because the Moon is no longer just a destination. It is integrating into a larger strategic ecosystem that encompasses cislunar communications, navigation, logistics, scientific research, resource use, and possibly energy and manufacturing.
NASA’s FY2027 budget request reflects this objective. The agency is requesting $18.8 billion, which includes $8.5 billion for Artemis and Moon-to-Mars missions, as well as $3 billion to assist the transition to a commercial orbital economy and commercial destinations in low-Earth orbit. NASA also intends to invest $624 million in space technology development and $3.9 billion in scientific activities.
The commercial sector is becoming increasingly important to this plan. NASA has already selected commercial partners for upcoming lunar missions, including roughly $600 million in awards announced in June 2026 for four lunar delivery missions set to launch in late 2028.
This is more than just a buying plan. It signifies a major shift in how America develops space capacity. The government is progressively defining missions, needs and strategic goals, while commercial businesses contribute innovation, manufacturing scale, launch capacity, data and increasingly sophisticated space infrastructure.
Space Is Becoming An Infrastructure Layer
The scope of this transition is astounding. As of July 2026, the European Space Agency’s Space Debris Office estimated that roughly 27,490 satellites had been launched into Earth orbit, with approximately 18,840 remaining in space and 16,000 still operational. More than 46,000 space objects are routinely tracked, and the total mass of objects in Earth orbit surpasses 17,000 metric tons.
The figures reveal only a portion of the tale. According to ESA, more than 1.2 million bits of debris larger than one centimeter are currently orbiting Earth, with over 50,000 objects larger than 10 cm believed to exist. At heavily populated altitudes, debris density approaches that of operational satellites.
The assumption is that orbital congestion has become a security concern. The United States must consequently consider space as an infrastructure ecosystem rather than a collection of separate stations. Redundancy, proliferation, autonomous maneuvering, rapid reconstitution, debris mitigation, alternative communication paths and the capacity to quickly replace or enhance damaged systems will all become more important for resilience.
That idea is already evident in the Space Development Agency’s (SDA) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, or PWSA.
From a Few Satellites to Resilient Constellations
One of the most significant transformations in US military space architecture has been the transition from reliance on a small number of expensive and highly competent satellites to proliferating, disaggregated, interconnected constellations.
In July 2026, SDA conducted the third launch of its Tranche 1 Transport Layer, increasing the number of Tranche 1 satellites in orbit to 63. These satellites enable low-latency communications and beyond-line-of-sight connectivity while also aiding with missile warning and tracking. SDA is rapidly going toward larger architectures. In December 2025, it allocated around $3.5 billion for 72 Tracking Layer satellites in Tranche 3. In July 2026, it signed deals worth around $1.75 billion to deploy additional 36 rapid missile-warning, tracking and missile-defense vehicles.
The significance goes beyond the quantity of satellites. The PWSA is being planned as a network, with transport, tracking, custody, combat management and navigation capabilities all intended to function together. SDA promotes its Custody Layer as offering permanent tracking of time-sensitive targets and assisting in reducing sensor-to-shooter delays through increased automation. This is the start of what I call “networked space power.”
The competitive edge will increase to those who can perceive, process, verify, communicate, decide and act quickly while remaining operational even when individual nodes are degraded or destroyed.
Golden Dome Alters the Strategic Equation
The administration’s Golden Dome for America plan adds a new dimension to the transition. Golden Dome represents the latest evolution in America’s long pursuit of layered, technology-driven missile defense—an effort that began more than four decades ago with General Daniel O. Graham’s High Frontier vision and President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). What began as a bold, controversial idea in the early 1980s has matured into a national imperative shaped by hypersonics, autonomous systems, AI-enabled targeting and the proliferation of long-range precision weapons.
The January 2025 executive order called for speeding the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer, expanding space-based interceptors, creating a custody layer within the PWSA, and developing both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.
The FY2027 federal budget request expands on the initial funds provided by the 2025 reconciliation legislation, calling for more development of space-based missile-defense sensors and interceptors, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.
The Space Force has since launched a Space-Based Interceptor program. Space Systems Command said in April 2026 that the initiative will seek to establish a proliferated LEO constellation capable of sustaining boost-, midcourse- and glide-phase operations. The original endeavor included 20 Other Transaction Authority agreements with 12 corporations, with a potential total value of up to $3.2 billion.
The Space Force named Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory as the program’s technical direction agent in July. The program will use a prize-based acquisition model to encourage commercial investment and competitiveness. The bigger lesson is significant: space is rapidly being integrated into homeland defense rather than being considered as a separate military realm. Space Force’s Space Based Interceptor Program to Counter Growing Speed and Maneuverability of Modern Missile Threats in support of Golden Dome for America > Space Systems Command > Newsroom
The Space Force Is Becoming a Digital Service
One of the most intriguing developments is that the Space Force now sees itself as a digital service. Its Future Operating Environment work openly recognizes cyberspace activities as a key enabler of almost every other Space Force task. The study identifies cyber resiliency by design, zero-trust principles, continuous monitoring, adaptive networks, AI-driven data fusion and on-orbit edge computing as future architecture components.
This is consistent with a subject I’ve underlined in my own writing: the real attack surface isn’t just in orbit. It is the complete digital ecology that surrounds the space. A satellite can be well constructed but still be jeopardized by its ground infrastructure, software, supply chain, cloud environment, contractor network, communications link, or identity-management system.
The Space Force’s August 2026 investment in a new multi-vendor Space Data Network exemplifies where things are going. The service is collaborating with five firms on an open architecture that aims to connect varied commercial satellite systems into a secure orbital mesh, decreasing reliance on single suppliers and increasing resilience. Space Force invests in resilient multi-vendor architecture to build next-gen Space Data Network > Space Systems Command > Newsroom
That is exactly the type of architecture required for a disputed environment. Artificial intelligence will become the nervous system of space. Artificial intelligence will increase between the massive amounts of data created by space systems and the humans who make judgments.
The Space Force will open its first AI Accelerator at Stanford University in April 2026, bringing together Guardians, researchers, national laboratories and businesses to create AI and machine-learning capabilities for space operations. The Air Force has also embraced an AI-first policy with the goal of transforming data and AI into strategic assets for air and space operations. Airmen, Guardians, software developers and industry partners tested a variety of AI-enabled systems in June 2026, with the goal of accelerating decision-making across air, space, cyber, marine and ground domains.
This is where space security starts to intersect with the larger AI transition. AI can assist in identifying aberrant satellite behavior, distinguishing regular maneuvers from possibly hostile activities, optimizing communications, detecting cyber intrusions, predicting orbital conjunctions, processing imagery and supporting command decisions.
AI Also Introduces New Hazards
Adversaries can utilize AI to automate reconnaissance, create sophisticated phishing and social engineering campaigns against space operators, uncover weaknesses, deceive, manipulate data and potentially expedite attacks on increasingly autonomous systems.
As I have argued in my broader articles on AI and cybersecurity, AI’s speed advantage is only useful provided the underlying data, identities, models, networks and decision processes are trustworthy. That principle is particularly true in space.
Cybersecurity is the Soft Underbelly
Satellite cybersecurity must include both the spacecraft and the terrestrial ecosystem that serves it. The danger environment has only grown more sophisticated. The 2022 outage of Viasat’s KA-SAT service, which occurred during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighted how an attack on satellite communications infrastructure can have far-reaching implications. Ground equipment, routers, networks, cloud services, software and end users can all connect to a space mission.
The federal government is increasingly aware of this situation. NIST’s IR 8270 identifies commercial space as an emerging critical infrastructure sector and outlines a methodology for addressing cybersecurity risk in commercial satellite operations. NIST has also created other profiles that cover satellite ground segments, hybrid satellite networks, and positioning, navigation, and timing.
The issue is especially important for NASA. A 2025 Government Accountability Office investigation discovered that NASA intended to invest more than $81 billion during the lifecycle of 36 major projects, while also noting shortcomings in the agency’s cybersecurity risk-management implementation and offering 16 recommendations. gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107591.pdf
This result has a broader implication for government and industry: cybersecurity cannot be tacked onto a spacecraft or mission after engineering is complete. Security must begin with architecture.
Zero Trust Must Extend to Orbit
The Zero Trust concepts, which are increasingly being employed in terrestrial networks, need to be extended to space systems. Every identity—human, machine, application, satellite, sensor, API and software process—must be constantly verified and permitted in accordance with mission context and least-privilege requirements.
That entails implementing security-by-design, continuous monitoring, hardware and software integrity, secure update mechanisms, strong identity and access management, encrypted communications, anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies, supply-chain visibility, software bills of materials and rigorous testing of command and control systems. The Space Force’s future operating ideas increasingly reflect this mentality, with zero trust and cyber resiliency built in by design.
I would take it a step farther. In an increasingly autonomous space environment, trust must be machine readable. A future satellite should not just verify that a command is coming from an authorized network. It should constantly assess if the identity, command, software state, behavior, data source and operational context are in line with mission objectives. That is where cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, identification and autonomous systems come together.
Commercial Space is Now Part of the Security Architecture
The United States cannot create its future space architecture only through government programs. The Space Force’s Commercial Space Strategy specifically calls for hybrid architectures that include government, commercial, allied and partner capabilities. It identifies robustness, interoperability, operational usefulness and time to field as critical issues. This is becoming more obvious in practice.
Commercial entities offer launch services, satellite communications, remote sensing, data analytics, space domain awareness, logistics, lunar landers, spacecraft and more complex software. The National Space Transportation Policy, which goes into effect in August 2026, furthers commercial integration. It outlines a federal goal of supporting over 1,000 launches and reentries per year by 2030, while also advocating for increased infrastructure, commercial investment, public-private partnerships and easier access to federal launch sites. That goal exemplifies the scope of the shift unfolding. The National Space Transportation Policy – The White House
However, commercial integration also poses a security conundrum. The more the government relies on commercial infrastructure, the more critical it is to guarantee that commercial systems are cybersecure, resilient, interoperable and capable of running during a crisis. Commercialization without cybersecurity may privatize the attack surface.
Acquisition Speed is Becoming a Strategic Capability
Another significant trend is the Space Force’s restructuring of acquisition. In July 2026, the service stated that it had completed the first phase of its Portfolio Acquisition Executive organization. Nine PAEs now have delegated authority and resources to accelerate decision-making, with more than 90% of non-restricted contractual authorities devolved into portfolios. The stated goal is to decrease bureaucracy and shift away from a culture of pursuing ideal systems and toward offering minimum viable capabilities while iterating quickly. Space Force Establishes 9 PAEs
This is significant since traditional acquisition cycles are poorly suited to software-defined technologies. A satellite architecture based on a ten- or fifteen-year technology cycle may become obsolete before the spacecraft reaches the end of its operational life. The best model is constant technology refreshment. This includes modular architectures, open standards, software-defined capabilities, commercial interfaces, fast experimentation, digital engineering and acquisition procedures that enable the government to adopt new technologies without completely redesigning the system.
Size & Speed Have Become Components of Deterrent
The scope of the FY2027 Space Force request demonstrates the government’s shifting objectives to a larger and more capable Space Force. The proposed Space Force budget of $71.1 billion is a $39.4 billion increase from the FY2026 plan. The proposal contains $40.7 billion for R&D, testing and evaluation, and it would expand authorized military end strength from around 10,400 to 13,200. Wilson_FY27BudgetBrief_20260817.pdf
Those figures should be interpreted as budget requests, not enacted appropriations. Nonetheless, they illustrate the path forward: increased investment in missile warning and tracking, robust systems, space control, cyber, communications, training, acquisition and emerging technologies.
The Space Force is likewise expanding its emphasis on allied and partner integration. Its International Partnership Strategy calls for allies and partners to be included in force design, development and operations, with a focus on interoperability and information sharing. This will be critical since no country can independently manage every layer of the current space ecology.
The Next Frontier Is Cislunar
The strategic geography of space is likewise growing. Low-Earth orbit is extremely important, but competition is expanding to geostationary orbit, medium Earth orbit, lunar orbit, the lunar surface, and, eventually, the broader cislunar environment.
The White House’s space policy particularly requires the ability to detect, identify and fight threats from very low-Earth orbit to cislunar space. The Space Force’s future operating ideas include enhanced propulsion, space tugs, autonomous maneuvering, robust cislunar navigation, on-orbit servicing, repair, refueling and logistics.
This implies that the next generation of space security will be more than just about safeguarding satellites. It will entail safeguarding space lines of communication, orbital infrastructure, logistical hubs, navigation systems, energy systems and even commercial activity near the Moon. The infrastructure of the future could extend from Earth to the Moon and eventually Mars.
What Comes Next?
The United States is entering what I refer to as the Age of Resilient Space Infrastructure. The winning architecture will not be characterized by a single exquisite satellite or government program. It will be defined by networks of interconnected systems that can sense, communicate, compute, maneuver, recover and reconstitute.
Five principles will be very significant:
First and foremost, resilience must replace fragility. Proliferated constellations, redundancy, alternative communication channels, quick launch and autonomous reconstitution should all be common design elements.
Second, cybersecurity must transition to mission assurance. Space systems should be designed with Zero Trust, identity security, secure software, supply chain integrity, continuous monitoring and security-by-design in mind.
Third, AI must become an operational capacity, albeit a regulated one. AI can give significant benefits in space domain awareness, anomaly detection, autonomous navigation, logistics, and decision support; nonetheless, mission-critical AI necessitates verification, auditability, adversarial testing and enough human control.
Fourth, commercial and government capacities must become fully interoperable. The government cannot afford to separate itself from the commercial sector’s innovation, manufacturing capability, launch frequency and investment.
Fifth, Q-Day preparations must start before quantum computers arrive. Space systems can have long life cycles, making cryptographic migration more problematic. Government and business should start cryptographic inventories, identify vulnerable algorithms, plan post-quantum migrations and incorporate cryptographic agility into future spacecraft and ground systems right away.
The High Frontier Has Become the Strategic Frontier
Space is no longer a safe haven from the rest of national security. It is interwoven with cyber, artificial intelligence, communications, missile defense, vital infrastructure, economic competitiveness, and, eventually, lunar and deep space exploration. The most significant strategic move may therefore be conceptual.
We should cease thinking about space security as only safeguarding things in orbit. We should think of it as safeguarding a distributed digital and physical infrastructure that is gradually linking Earth, orbit, the Moon, and, eventually, Mars.
The White House’s exploration goals, NASA’s Moon-to-Mars plans, the Space Force’s diverse architectures, the Golden Dome, commercial launch expansion, AI integration and cyber-resilient space systems are all part of the same evolving ecosystem.
The United States has the opportunity to lead that ecosystem, but it will require more than rockets and satellites. It will necessitate durable architectures, secure digital infrastructure, quick acquisition, commercial innovation, collaborative efforts and a workforce capable of operating at the intersection of space, cyber, AI, quantum and autonomous systems.
The high border is becoming a strategic frontier. In this new era, the nation that can innovate, secure and sustain its space infrastructure at machine speed will have a significant advantage—not only in terms of national security, but also in creating the next chapter of human exploration and economic growth.
