Chuck Brooks is the president of Brooks Consulting International and one of Executive Mosaic’s GovCon Experts.
The United States is about to enter a new age of technical competitiveness where the rate of innovation and invention could have just as much of an impact on national security as the technology itself. Emerging technologies such as directed energy, biotechnology, autonomous systems, robotics, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence and quantum computing are developing concurrently and rapidly converging.
This convergence is posing a fundamental dilemma for the Department of War: Can the government organize itself to find, develop, buy and field new technology at the same rate as the business sector and America’s adversaries? A major reorganization of the Department’s research, technology and innovation ecosystem is starting to reveal the solution.
An organizational restructuring is not as significant as the current developments. They are an effort to shift the Department from a disjointed, linear paradigm of research and acquisition to an ecosystem that allows for much faster interaction between labs, commercial innovators, venture capital, warfighters, technological companies and acquisition authorities.
I have been supporting this development for many years. I’ve made the case in my writings on innovation, technology convergence and public-private partnerships that the most significant discoveries are increasingly made at the nexus of academia, business and government rather than within discrete institutional silos. In an effort to formalize that idea at the core of America’s national security enterprise, the Department has developed a new model.
A Novel Framework for Defense Innovation
Under the direction of Emil Michael, the Department’s Chief Technology Officer and Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced a significant makeover of the Department’s innovation ecosystem in January 2026.
Transforming the Defense Innovation Ecosystem to Accelerate Warfighting Advantage, the following memo, was remarkably candid about the issue. It contended that the current innovation system had devolved into a conglomeration of conflicting authorities, overlapping organizations and numerous “front doors” for business. The new goal is to have a more cohesive system with more transparent accountability and a significantly quicker transition to new technologies.
The Defense Innovation Unit, Strategic Capabilities Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, Office of Strategic Capital and Test Resource Management Center are six significant organizations that have since been added to the R&E ecosystem. This is significant because these organizations represent various phases of the innovation cycle.
Traditionally, DARPA has pushed the limits of what is technically feasible. DIU investigates and expedites commercial technology. SCO concentrates on quickly creating capabilities that have the potential to have strategic impacts. The Department’s digital and AI transformation is being accelerated by CDAO. Financial and investment procedures are introduced by OSC. TRMC offers essential infrastructure for testing and assessment.
Making these groups operate more effectively on an individual basis is not the only opportunity. It’s to force them to cooperate. That is the new ecosystem’s true significance.
Transitioning from Linear R&D to Continuous Innovation
When technological cycles were measured in years or decades, this model made more sense. For decades, government technology development has frequently followed a sequential model: identify a requirement, fund research, develop a prototype, conduct testing, enter acquisition and finally field the capability.
It is becoming more and more out of step with a world where software can be updated on a regular basis, commercial drones can develop in weeks, AI models can advance significantly in months, and quantum capabilities can move quickly from lab to operational experimentation. The Department’s new approach acknowledges this fact.
Assistant Secretary of War for Science and Technology Joseph Jewell, whose S&T organization is in charge of basic and early applied research as well as fields like hypersonics, biotechnology, biomanufacturing and manufacturing technology, recently described the reorganization as facilitating what he called “virtuous cycles of collaboration.” Jewell emphasized in particular the improved communication between SCO and his company, DARPA.
The idea of a positive feedback loop is essential to government innovation in the future. Discoveries are produced by research. Prototypes are produced by discoveries. Operational feedback is produced by prototypes. New requirements are produced by operational input. New research is produced by those requirements. Commercial businesses contribute new concepts and innovations to the cycle. Capital aids in the expansion of potential businesses. Treating innovation as a sequence of bureaucratic handoffs is fundamentally different from using test organizations to identify what truly works. The cycle then repeats—faster.
The Critical Technology Bridge & the “DoddFather”
Another key component of the new architecture is the appointment of Michael Dodd as Assistant Secretary of War for Critical Technologies. President Trump nominated Dodd in March 2025, and the Senate confirmed him in September of the same year. Dodd’s defense technology newsletter has earned him the colloquial “DoddFather” title. His portfolio was created with the express purpose of identifying, prioritizing and transferring important technologies that have the potential to produce asymmetric military advantages.
In addition to enabling fields including microelectronics, space technology, nuclear command and control, sophisticated computing and software, Dodd now controls three crucial technology areas: Contested Logistics, Quantum Battlefield Information Dominance and Scaled Directed Energy.
This is a crucial link between military prowess and technological advancement. In the past, the Department has been excellent at both supporting science and developing large-scale weaponry. The journey from intriguing technology to something that can really be deployed, maintained and scaled has frequently proven to be the more difficult issue.
The new ecology can have an impact during that shift. Additionally, it highlights the significance of tech foraging, In order to find technologies, concepts, research, businesses and capabilities that might address new issues, technology foraging entails aggressively looking beyond conventional organizational boundaries. A university, a tiny startup, a commercial technology business, a defense laboratory, or an entrepreneur who has never dealt with the government before might provide the most promising invention. Early detection of the signals is essential for the government to take appropriate action.
AI Turns Into an Innovation Operating System
Perhaps the most significant driver of this change is artificial intelligence. Making the military a “AI-first” organization was the goal set forth in the Department’s January 2026 AI Acceleration Strategy. Seven Pace-Setting Projects covering corporate operations, intelligence and warfighting form the foundation of the approach.
The most important ones are Ender’s Foundry, which focuses on AI-enabled simulation; Agent Network, which employs AI agents for battle management and decision assistance; and Swarm Forge, which concentrates on AI-enabled capabilities and autonomous systems.
Instead of depending solely on slower conventional processes, the Department then introduced Agent Network to continually process intelligence and operational data and give commanders AI-generated options in a matter of seconds. This exemplifies the broader change. AI isn’t just going to be another weapon. It’s starting to accelerate innovation.
Researchers can use AI to prioritize studies, assess scientific literature, find patterns in experimental data, produce hypotheses, improve designs and simulate settings. It can assist engineers in creating autonomous systems and software. Acquisition specialists might use it to find marketable technologies. Warfighters can use it to assess systems in practical settings.
I made the case that AI is altering research itself in a recent GovConWire article about AI and quantum R&D. AI can speed up feedback loops between data, modeling, experimentation and discovery rather than depending solely on human teams to sequentially develop ideas, carry out tests and analyze findings.
The Department of War’s collaboration with the White House’s Genesis Mission serves as an example of this new paradigm. That is exactly the kind of capability that the new Department of War ecosystem should take advantage of. The Department said in July that it plans to use the effort to allocate more than $200 million in FY2026 and more than $1.3 billion in FY2027 to important national science and technology concerns. It intends to leverage AI to speed up scientific discovery and supply the Genesis Mission platform with verified aeronautical, hydrodynamic, acoustic and sensor data. For more analysis, please see this article.
This has the capacity to change things. “What new forms of research become possible when AI becomes part of the scientific process?” is a more crucial issue than “How can AI help us perform today’s research faster?”
Quantum: From Emerging Technology to Applications
Another example of why the ecosystem needs to integrate basic research, applied technology, acquisition and operational experimentation is quantum technology. The focus is mostly on quantum computing, but quantum timing and sensing could yield significant defense applications sooner.
A multi-phase quantum sensing project with the potential to invest up to $200 million over the next year was unveiled in June by the Department’s Defense Innovation Unit. In order to improve intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in disputed situations, the initiative focuses on technology including electric-field sensors, magnetometers, gravity gradiometers and tactical clocks.
Additionally, quantum is generating a pressing cybersecurity need. In June, the Department published a Post-Quantum Cryptography Strategy that calls for the implementation of quantum-resistant cryptography on high-impact systems by 2030 and throughout the force by 2031. This illustrates a key feature of evolving technology: security and innovation are inextricably linked.
A new vulnerability may be produced by the same technology that produces a new capacity. AI can both strengthen cyber defense and make more complex attacks possible. In addition to providing new forms of secure communications and sensing, quantum computing has the potential to someday weaken commonly used encryption methods. The warfighter’s reach can be increased, and new attack surfaces can be created by autonomous systems.
Therefore, both technology advantage and technological resilience must be considered while designing the new innovation ecosystem. Both opportunity and risk are increased by technological convergence. Since the strategic value of AI, quantum, connectivity, sensors, robotics and new materials is increasingly derived from their interactions, they should not be controlled as separate categories.
Cybersecurity – A DOW Innovation Imperative
In an era of relentless adversarial probing and accelerating technological change, the U.S. Department of War’s cybersecurity innovation efforts represent a decisive shift from incremental evolution to transformative modernization—exactly the kind of strategic recalibration our national security demands.
The Department’s present course serves as an example of proactive adaptation. Initiatives focused on upgrading the cyber workforce, strengthening Identity, Credential and Access Management, modernizing the Risk Management Framework, and integrating zero trust as an operational philosophy rather than just a compliance exercise.
This vision has been succinctly and clearly expressed by Aaron Bishop, the Chief Information Security Officer and Acting Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cybersecurity at the Department of War. In order to move away from static documentation that gets outdated before systems are even permitted, he has detailed improvements centered on automation, simplification, continuous monitoring and live telemetry from DevSecOps pipelines.
He also noted that the Department of War’s zero trust targets and foundational activities, describing them as mechanisms to drive modernization and implementation. “The zero trust mandate is a forcing function,” he said. “Everyone needs to transform. Evolution takes too long.”
These initiatives are closely related to the Department’s larger push for safe software delivery and cybersecurity resilience at Defense Industrial Base. Sustained public-private cooperation and a cultural change that views cybersecurity as fundamental to all systems, weapon platforms and operational technological environments will be necessary for success.
The Department of War is building a robust, flexible digital weaponry that can win in disputed cyberspace, not just patching weaknesses. That is a must for innovation.
The Revolution in Drone & Robotics Technology Is Turning Into an Acquisition Revolution
Drones and robotics are two technologies that best illustrate how urgent this change is. The Department’s Drone Dominance program aims to alter the acquisition strategy and economics of unmanned systems in addition to their technology. 25 suppliers competed in the program’s first “gauntlet” to find technologies that could be quickly evaluated and manufactured. The Department has stated that it aims to produce hundreds of thousands of inexpensive small, unmanned aircraft, with unit costs significantly decreasing as manufacturing increases. Drone Dominance
By June, the program had entered a second phase with 49 businesses and 79 distinct unmanned aircraft systems, illustrating how the strategy is intended to accelerate testing and fielding while fostering competition.
The Department went one step further in July, combining autonomous and unmanned systems under a portfolio manager who directly reports to the Deputy Secretary of War. The action acknowledges that autonomy is no longer a specialized area of technology. It is evolving into a cross-domain capacity that impacts the air, land, sea and possibly space.
The merging of robots and AI is very important. These days, a drone is more than just an airplane. It becomes a node in an intelligent system when it is outfitted with AI, sensors, edge computing, secure communications and autonomous navigation.
It is possible for several autonomous systems to coordinate, communicate and adjust. Sensing and decision-making can be dispersed over dozens or hundreds of platforms by a swarm. It is possible for an autonomous car to function in situations when human operator connections are either refused or sporadic.
Swarm Forge is strategically significant because of this. It links AI research with autonomous systems in the actual world and input from combatants. Systems of systems, as opposed to individual platforms, will play a bigger role in the military innovation ecosystem of the future.
The DOW Ecosystem Includes the Commercial Sector
The Department’s increasing focus on nontraditional businesses is one of the most positive trends. I have been writing about the value of public-private partnerships in technology innovation for many years. The government has a vast amount of data, laboratories, research capacity and mission requirements. Industry has a vast pool of entrepreneurial skill, industrial capacity, investment capital and commercial agility. Both fundamental research and specialized knowledge are provided by academia.
Connecting those assets is the difficult part. Faster technological transition models, flexible contracting procedures and common R&D routes must be developed by the government and business.
Recently, the U.S. Army opened four premier stateside military test ranges and collaborating with partners to open an international military test range to private industry for their internal research, development and rapid experimentation. As a part of the initiative, the Army launched a portal which serves as a digital “front door” for industry.
Another real-world example is the Navy’s recently established National Security Plug and Play Consortium. The National Security Plug and Play Consortium was created on August 11 by the Department of the Navy Rapid Capabilities Office with the goal of utilizing Other Transaction Agreements to expedite research, development and production in order to link the Navy with technology businesses and entrepreneurs.
Additionally, it will use wargaming challenges, reward challenges, commercial solutions openings and disruptor events. The importance goes beyond the Navy. This is a new paradigm for government outreach beyond the conventional defense industrial base.
The private sector is also investing directly in national security technologies. JPMorgan has announced that it’s planning a $1.5 trillion investment initiative aimed at bolstering national security over the next decade, including up to $10 billion in direct equity and venture investments.
It is not necessary for the Department to create anything on its own. It must build an ecosystem that can recognize what already exists, figure out what can be modified, test it with people and quickly scale what works. That’s what technological foraging is all about.
Reevaluating the Defense Industrial Base
Additionally, the new ecosystem acknowledges that industrial capability is ultimately necessary for innovation. Advanced semiconductors and computing infrastructure are needed for AI. Specialized manufacturing, electronics and hardware are needed for quantum. Batteries, sensors, connectivity, software, motors, materials and safe supply chains are all necessary for autonomous systems. Power, optics, materials and advanced manufacturing are necessary for directed-energy systems.
Thus, the innovation ecosystem spans from labs to factories. One helpful example is the Department’s Microelectronics Commons initiative. According to recent program data provided by the National Security Technology Accelerator, the effort has progressed over 220 concepts throughout the pipeline, produced over 61,000 chips domestically and sparked $1.2 billion in matching non-CHIPS investment.
Similarly, the Department’s APFIT program has transferred more than 100 unique capabilities to the warfighter and has now been awarded more than $2 billion in total. These initiatives point to a larger idea: R&D investment shouldn’t stop with a successful laboratory demonstration.
Development, transition, manufacturing, deployment and scalability must be the goals. The laboratories continue to be the cornerstone. The significance of the Department’s labs is not diminished by any of this.
In fact, it is the exact opposite. Many of the fundamental science and engineering that will support future military capabilities continue to come from the Department’s laboratory enterprise. Researchers showcased a variety of innovations at Pentagon Lab Day in May, including robotic systems, directed-energy concepts and sophisticated biological materials. The laboratory enterprise’s subsequent R&E evaluation looked for ways to speed up the operational application of laboratory advances and lessen bureaucratic friction.
The Department must preserve equilibrium in this area. Basic research must continue to be sufficiently accessible to promote scientific innovation and cooperation. Applied research must continue to be linked to new operational requirements. Real strategic benefits must be safeguarded in classified research. Additionally, transition procedures need to keep promising innovations from being stuck in what’s known as the “valley of death” between acquisition and demonstration.
As a result, Jewell’s role in FFRDCs, UARCs, basic research, STEM programs and the SBIR/STTR ecosystem is particularly significant. The laboratory is only one node in the innovation network; it is not the end of the process.
How Success Will Be Measured
In the end, results should be used to gauge the Department’s new innovation ecosystem’s success rather than organizational charts.
*Is it possible for a promising technology to go from a university lab to a defense prototype in a matter of months as opposed to years?
*Is it possible for a company with innovative technologies to navigate an organizational maze and locate the right government door?
*Are warfighters able to test new technology quickly and provide engineers with direct feedback?
*Is it possible for AI to speed up the actual process of scientific discovery?
*Is it possible for quantum sensing to transition from lab experiments to practical ISR?
*Is it possible to test, trust and deploy autonomous systems on a large scale?
*Is it possible for home production to grow quickly enough to sustain these technologies in an emergency?
Perhaps most crucially, is it possible for the Department to foster an atmosphere in which experiment failure is tolerated but failure to draw lessons from it is not? These are the important metrics.
The Overarching Strategic View
There is a broader geopolitical context to the Department of War’s innovation makeover. AI, quantum, robotics, sophisticated manufacturing, space systems, biotechnology and other dual-use technologies are areas in which China and its rivals are making significant investments. The use of commercial technology as a strategic resource is growing. The gap between military and civilian technologies is losing significance.
This implies that the US requires an ecosystem for innovation that goes beyond military. A national innovation ecosystem is required. Government labs, academic institutions, startups, venture capital, well-established defense firms, commercial technology firms, allied nations and—most importantly—the warfighter must all be connected by this ecosystem.
This aligns with my recent writing’s more general conclusions. One innovative invention won’t be the deciding factor in the next phase of technological competition. Technology convergence and the institutions that can take advantage of it will decide it. Please see this article.
The cognitive layer will be provided by AI. Quantum technologies will revolutionize cybersecurity, computing, sensing and timing. Human capacities will be expanded by robotics and autonomous systems. What can be constructed and at what scale will depend on advanced manufacturing and materials. Secure connectivity will enable those systems to function as networks. The layer of trust will be provided by cybersecurity. Additionally, R&D will continue to be the catalyst for realizing new opportunities.
The Race for Innovation Is an Ecosystem Race
Therefore, no single AI program, quantum initiative, drone competition, or lab project may be the Department of War’s most significant breakthrough. It is an effort to create an institutional framework that allows them all to support one another.
The Department’s new R&E structure, the promotion of DIU and other innovation organizations, Michael Dodd’s critical technology portfolio, Joseph Jewell’s leadership in S&T, the AI-first strategy, the quantum initiatives, the Drone Dominance program, APFIT, the laboratory reforms and the Navy’s Plug and Play Consortium all point in the same direction. The ability to move quickly is becoming strategically important.
World-class universities, national laboratories, entrepreneurs, venture capital, technological businesses, research institutes and a vast defense industrial base are just a few of the many advantages that the United States has in place. Lack of American inventiveness has never been the problem.
Connecting that creativity to national security missions in a timely manner has proven difficult. The Department of War’s new innovation ecosystem is an attempt to address this issue. The outcome will be more than just a quicker acquisition mechanism if it is successful. It might develop into a new paradigm for government innovation, one built on ongoing technology exploration, public-private cooperation, quick experimentation, AI-accelerated R&D and the fusion of operational expertise, science and engineering.
Faster discovery, experimentation, learning, building and fielding should be the ultimate goals. The country that can bridge the gap between a concept and an operational capacity would have one of the most significant strategic advantages in a time of rapid technical advancement.
Inventing is no longer the only goal of the innovation race. It’s a race to use invention to one’s advantage.
